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THE FAIRNESS OF TRIBAL COURT JURIES AND 
NON-INDIAN DEFENDANTS 
Julia M. Bedell
*
 
Introduction 
At oral argument for Dollar General v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw 
Indians,
1
 Chief Justice John Roberts twice asked the Mississippi Choctaw’s 
counsel if it would violate due process for a non-Indian defendant to be 
tried by a tribal court jury that consisted solely of tribal members.
2
 In 
response to this question, former Solicitor General Neal Katyal, 
representing the Tribe, clarified that the tribal court proceeding at issue was 
a bench trial and it was therefore unnecessary to consider jury selection.
3
 
Chief Justice Roberts replied: “I understand that. But it’s kind of a yes-or-
no question. Does it […] violate due process as a general matter for a 
nonmember to be subjected to a jury trial with the jury composed solely of 
members of the Tribe?”4 
In light of the procedural requirements tribal courts must adopt to assert 
jurisdiction over non-Indians, the answer to the Chief Justice’s question is 
quite likely, “no.” So long as a tribe can meet the Supreme Court’s test for a 
fair jury pool cross-section under Duren v. Missouri,
5
 tribal courts should 
be situated the same as state or federal courts when asserting jurisdiction 
                                                                                                                 
 * J.D., Columbia Law School, 2016; B.S., Bates College, 2010. The author currently 
lives and works in Anchorage, Alaska. She would like to thank the editors of the American 
Indian Law Review for their dedication and assistance, as well as the presenters at the 2016 
Federal Bar Association Indian Law Conference panel on the continuing development of 
tribal court criminal jurisdiction, whose comments inspired this writing. 
 1. Dollar General Corp. v. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, 136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016) (per 
curiam) (upholding the Fifth Circuit’s recognition of the tribal court’s jurisdiction over a tort 
claim against Dollar General).  
 2. Transcript of Oral Argument at 42, Dollar General, 136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016) (No. 13-
1496) (argued Dec. 7, 2015). 
 3. Id. The underlying case is a tort suit brought in tribal court against Dollar General 
and one of its store managers on behalf of a tribal member youth who participated in the 
tribe’s Youth Opportunity Program, which places tribal members in unpaid positions at 
businesses located within the tribe’s jurisdictional boundaries for educational purposes. The 
youth brought a sexual molestation claim against the manager and sued both the manager 
and Dollar General in tribal court for $2.5 million in damages. Petition for Writ of Certiorari 
at 2, Dollar General. 
 4. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 2. 
 5. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979). 
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over non-Indians. Therefore, the hypothetical all-tribal-member jury 
empaneled in a case involving a non-Indian defendant would likely satisfy 
the Court’s requirements to the same extent as would an all-Massachusetts-
resident, Red Sox-fanatic jury in a Massachusetts state court trial involving 
a New York defendant who supports the Yankees.
6
 
Yet this question highlights the unique status of tribal courts as 
compared to state and federal courts. Indian tribes are neither foreign 
nations, nor are they the equivalent of states.
7
 As a result, although tribal 
courts that now exercise jurisdiction over non-Indian defendants through 
the Violence Against Women Act 2013 Reauthorization
8
 (VAWA) should 
theoretically provide fair jury trials as dictated by Supreme Court 
precedent, they will also be held to a different standard by federal courts 
reviewing such challenges.  
In light of such expected scrutiny, this Article reconsiders the fairness of 
tribal court criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.
9
 Policymakers tasked 
with determining such fairness should consider at least two vantage points: 
not only the non-Indian defendant’s right to a fair trial, but also a tribe’s 
interest in being able to adequately police and govern its land. The first 
consideration has consistently been emphasized and protected by the 
Supreme Court. And for good reason: constitutional rights of criminal 
defendants are paramount and must be protected in any forum. However, 
the second consideration—a tribe’s interest in protecting its land and 
people—is no less important.  Assuming that tribal courts are found to be 
able to provide fair trials to non-Indians,
10
 Congress should also consider a 
                                                                                                                 
 6. Justice Breyer made this comparison in oral argument, resulting in much laughter. 
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 2, at 43. 
 7. Katherine Florey, Beyond Uniqueness: Reimagining Tribal Courts' Jurisdiction, 101 
CAL. L. REV. 1499, 1501-02 (2013). 
 8. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, sec. 904, 
§ 204(b)(4)(B), 127 Stat. 54, 122 (codified at 25 U.S.C.A. § 1304(b)(1) (West 2014)). 
 9. Tribal courts also have limited civil jurisdiction over non-Indians. See Matthew 
L.M. Fletcher, Contract and (Tribal) Jurisdiction, 126 YALE L.J. FORUM, 1, 2 (2016), http:/ 
/www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/FletcherPDF_xevyxrdi.pdf (“The Court’s working theory, 
memorialized in the Montana test, is that Indian nations do not have jurisdiction over 
nonmembers, except in two circumstances. One is where nonmember activity is potentially 
“catastrophic” to tribal government operations and reservation life. The other is where a 
nonmember consents, usually through a commercial transaction, to tribal jurisdiction.” 
(footnotes omitted)); Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564-66 (1981). Although 
criminal and civil jurisdiction should theoretically be consistent, in light of the already-
established bifurcation, this article limits its focus to tribal court criminal jurisdiction.  
 10. Despite a policy rationale for arguing that tribal courts should be required to satisfy 
constitutional due process requirements for Indian defendants as well as for non-Indians, 
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tribe’s interest in regaining broader criminal jurisdiction over the many 
non-Indians working and living within Indian country when determining 
the future scope of tribal court jurisdiction over non-Indians. 
Not only will tribal courts satisfy the legal requirements for a fair jury 
trial when exercising criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, but 
overarching fairness considerations demand that tribal courts be recognized 
to have criminal jurisdiction over all non-Indians whom a tribe considers to 
be members of a tribe’s community. This jurisdictional definition is a 
natural extension of the logic employed in VAWA: tribal courts should 
have criminal jurisdiction over certain non-Indians who have demonstrated 
sufficient ties to a tribe so as to justify the tribal court’s jurisdiction.  
Part I of this Article provides an overview of tribal court systems as they 
have developed within Indian country. Part II presents a history of the 
Supreme Court’s rhetoric regarding the fairness of tribal court trials to 
demonstrate the Court’s focus on protecting non-Indian rights, often at the 
expense of tribal court jurisdiction. Part III sets forth the legal requirements 
for a fair jury pool composition under Duren v. Missouri and looks to how 
tribes have modified their jury selection procedures to meet this standard. 
Finally, Part IV considers Indian tribes’ interest in adequately policing its 
land and argues that Congress should recognize tribal court criminal 
jurisdiction over all non-Indians whom a tribe deems to be part of its 
“community.” 
I. History of Tribal Court Systems  
Tribal courts occupy a unique space in the American legal scheme.
11
 
Indian tribes predate the United States government, yet tribal governments 
are not recognized as foreign nations.
12
 In addition, state laws do not apply 
on Indian land.
13
 Instead, the Supreme Court has held that tribes retain 
inherent sovereignty, subject to congressional oversight.
14
  
Consequently, the United States Constitution does not apply to tribal 
courts and tribal courts are not bound to provide all of the due process 
                                                                                                                 
tribal courts are currently not required to provide the full Bill of Rights to Indian criminal 
defendants. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896).  
 11. Florey, supra note 7, at 1501-02. 
 12. Id.  
 13. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). 
 14. Id. 
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protections guaranteed to defendants in state and federal prosecutions.
15
 
Such a situation raises concerns as to whether tribal courts can fairly 
adjudicate claims against non-Indians. This part provides a basic overview 
of tribal court systems and the lands over which they govern to better 
explain the legal and physical contexts in which tribal courts operate. 
A. An Overview of Indian Country 
The composition of Indian country
16
 today is relevant to any study on 
tribal court fairness in adjudicating claims against non-Indians. It is a 
surprising fact that non-Indians currently outnumber Indians within Indian 
country: of the 4.6 million people that currently live in Indian country, only 
1.1 million identify as Indian.
17
 This is due partly to the legacy of allotment, 
a period of time during which the federal government apportioned tribal 
land into parcels and subsequently transferred many of those parcels from 
Indians to non-Indians.
18
 Because of the disorganized nature of this land 
transfer, some tribal jurisdictions (such as the Navajo Nation) contain 
almost all Indians, yet many others (such as the Port Madison Reservation) 
contain a vast majority of non-Indians.
19
  
In addition, as a result of tribal governments’ success in Indian gaming 
and other tribal economic development initiatives, many non-Indians work 
                                                                                                                 
 15. Talton, 163 U.S. at 383-85 (explaining that Congress’s ability to regulate “the 
manner in which” local powers of tribal governments are exercised “does not render such 
local powers federal powers arising from and created by” the Constitution). 
 16. “Indian country” is a term of art that encompasses the land on which all Indian 
tribes reside. It is defined as 
(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of 
the United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, 
including rights-of-way running through the reservation, (b) all dependent 
Indian communities within the borders of the United States whether within the 
original or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether within or 
without the limits of a state, and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to 
which have not been extinguished, including rights-of-way running through the 
same. 
Indian Country Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2012). 
 17. Cynthia Castillo, Tribal Courts, Non-Indians, and the Right to an Impartial Jury 
After the 2013 Reauthorization of VAWA, 39 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 311, 325-26 (2014-2015). 
 18. Philip P. Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism: The Judicial 
Divestiture of Indian Tribal Authority over Nonmembers, 109 YALE L.J. 1, 15 (1999) 
(“Because of allotment, many reservations today have a significant non-Indian population 
and a checkerboard land pattern with non-Indian fee property mixed in with Indian 
allotments and collective tribal property.”). 
 19. Castillo, supra note 17, at 326 (citing Frickey, supra note 18, at 15). 
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or reside within Indian country. Indian tribes today collectively employ 
hundreds of thousands of American citizens who are not tribal members.
20
 
Although those employees may not necessarily reside on tribal land, their 
employment with tribal governmental entities provides strong links to the 
tribes.
21
  
Finally, and largely the reason for enactment of the tribal VAWA 
provision, many non-Indians who reside or work in Indian country are 
intimately involved with Indians.
22
 It is not uncommon for non-Indians who 
are married to Indians to become eligible for tribal governmental resources 
and benefits through their Indian spouses.
23
  
In summary, Indian country today is quite often comprised of more non-
Indians than Indians. Although some tribal jurisdictions remain 
predominantly closed off from non-Indian populations, the rise in Indian 
commerce—most notably, casino gaming—has led to increased 
intermingling between Indians and non-Indians.
24
 It is within this backdrop 
that tribal courts operate.  
B. Tribal Court Systems 
Indian tribes have engaged in community dispute resolution practices 
since before the founding of the United States.
25
 However, Congress has 
repeatedly intervened in tribal justice systems pursuant to its plenary 
authority over Indian affairs.
26
 Many modern tribal courts evolved from 
courts first established in Indian country by the Bureau of Indian Affairs 
                                                                                                                 
 20. Matthew Fletcher & Leah Jurss, Tribal Jurisdiction—A Historical Bargain, 76 MD. 
L. REV. 593, 594 (2017) (“The 567 federally recognized Indian nations employ hundreds of 
thousands of American citizens who are not members of an Indian nation. Indian nations and 
nonmember business partners do billions of dollars of business every year. Thousands of 
nonmembers lease housing, grazing lands, mineral rights, and other properties from Indian 
nations. And many thousands enjoy the benefits of tribal government services, from health 
care to social services to public safety protections.”). 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 594-95. 
 23. Id. at 595. 
 24. See Paul Monies, Indian Gaming Helps Drive Rural Oklahoma Economies, Report 
Finds, NEWS OK (July 26, 2017), http://newsok.com/article/5557665. 
 25. See Matthew Fletcher, Anishinaabe Law and The Round House, 10 ALBANY GOV’T 
L. REV. 88 (2017) (explaining the Anishinaabe’s traditional forms of law and order that 
predate United States legal systems). 
 26. Federal power to regulate Indian affairs has been determined to derive from the text 
and structure of the Constitution: namely, the Indian commerce clause. COHEN’S HANDBOOK 
OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 5.01 (Neil Jessup Newton et al. eds., 2012 ed.) [hereinafter 
COHEN’S HANDBOOK]. 
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during the late nineteenth century as part of an effort to assimilate Indians 
into the Anglo-American legal system.
27
 These “Courts of Indian 
Offenses,” commonly known as “CFR courts” because they apply the Code 
of Federal Regulations, largely served to assimilate Indians into mainstream 
American society.
28
 Today, fewer than twenty CFR courts remain in 
effect.
29
 Instead, CFR courts have largely been replaced by tribal court 
systems.
30
  
In 1934, Congress passed the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA),
31
  
allowing tribes to create and operate their own court systems and to write 
their own codes of laws to supplant the Code of Federal Regulations.
32
 
Congress also required tribes to obtain the Department of the Interior’s 
approval for the tribes’ laws before being able to replace the CFR.33 
Consequently, many tribes simply codified the CFR, or made only slight 
adaptations, into their own tribal codes so as to obtain the Department’s 
approval.
34
  
Indian tribes predate the United States Constitution and are recognized to 
possess inherent tribal sovereignty.
35
 Because tribal governments are 
sovereign nations, the Constitution does not apply to tribal governmental 
affairs, and therefore tribal courts are not governed by constitutional due 
process requirements.
36
 Instead, in 1968 Congress passed the Indian Civil 
Rights Act (ICRA) that imposed many (though not all) of the rights 
guaranteed in the Constitution onto tribal courts and governments.
37
 As a 
                                                                                                                 
 27. BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, PATHWAYS TO JUSTICE: BUILDING AND SUSTAINING 
TRIBAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 9 (2005), https://www. 
walkingoncommonground.org/files/Background%206%20Pathways_Report_Final.pdf 
[hereinafter PATHWAYS TO JUSTICE].  
 28. COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 26, § 4.04. 
 29. 25 C.F.R. § 11.100 (2016). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479). 
 32. PATHWAYS TO JUSTICE, supra note 27, at 10.  
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 383-84 (1896). 
 36. Id. at 384-85. 
 37. Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2012). Congress passed the ICRA in 
1968. Previously, the Bill of Rights was found not to apply to Indian tribes. Talton, 163 U.S. 
at 384-85; see also Carla Christofferson, Note, Trial Courts' Failure to Protect Native 
American Women: A Reevaluation of the Indian Civil Rights Act, 101 YALE L.J. 169, 169 n.4 
(1991). 
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result of the United States’ intervention, many of the almost 30038 tribal 
courts currently in operation resemble state and federal courts in both their 
procedural and substantive law.
39
  
However, although many tribal courts currently resemble their state and 
federal counterparts, tribal courts have extremely limited jurisdiction over 
non-Indians in both the civil and criminal contexts.
40
 This limited 
jurisdiction causes serious law enforcement problems in light of the 
composition of Indian country, where only about one-quarter of people 
today identify as Indian.
41
 Despite the presence of many non-Indians within 
Indian country, a tribal court most often will not have jurisdiction over 
crimes committed by those non-Indians.
42
  
The 2013 Reauthorization of VAWA provided tribal courts with 
jurisdiction over non-Indians in the limited context of domestic violence 
relationships.
43
 VAWA recognizes tribes’ inherent power to exercise 
“special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction” over non-Indians who 
commit acts of domestic violence on Indian land against Indian women.
44
 
The VAWA tribal court provision was enacted specifically to combat the 
extraordinarily high levels of violence against Indian women and is seen as 
a victory for tribal governance and sovereignty.
45
 Eight tribes participated 
                                                                                                                 
 38. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, A Unifying Theory of Tribal Civil Jurisdiction, 46 ARIZ. ST. 
L.J. 779, 790 n.63 (2015) (“A 2005 report on Indian courts noted that the Bureau of Justice 
Assistance had awarded grants to 294 Indian tribes for planning and enhancing their court 
systems.”) (citing PATHWAYS TO JUSTICE, supra note 27, at 4). 
 39. OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, TRIBAL CRIME DATA 
COLLECTION ACTIVITIES, 2015 (Tech. Report NCJ 248785, July 2015), http://www. 
bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/tcdca15.pdf; Some tribal courts also apply their own tribal law in 
addition to adapted federal and state law. COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 26, § 4.05. 
 40. COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 26, §§ 7.02, 9.04.  
 41. Castillo, supra note 17, at 325-26. 
 42. Tribes generally lack criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians but retain jurisdiction 
over “all Indians,” including their own citizens as well as “nonmember Indians.” Neither 
Congress nor the federal courts have carefully considered who is included in this category. 
Addie C. Rolnick, Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction Beyond Citizenship and Blood, 39 AM. 
INDIAN L. REV. 337, 340 (2014-2015). 
 43. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, sec. 904, 
§ 204(b)(4)(B), 127 Stat. 54, 122 (codified at 25 U.S.C.A. § 1304(b)(1) (West 2014)). 
 44. VAWA recognizes and affirms “special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction” 
over non-Indians as part of the inherent jurisdiction of Indian tribes defined in the Indian 
Civil Rights Act. Id.  
 45. See, e.g., Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, § 202(a)(5), 124 
Stat. 2261, 2262 (“It is estimated that 34% of Indian women will be raped in their lifetime 
(compared to the nationwide rate of 20%, including Indians.”)); Brief of Amici Curiae 
National Indigenous Women's Resource Center and Additional Advocacy Organizations for 
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in VAWA’s Pilot Program and many others are now in the process of 
implementing this jurisdiction.
46
 
VAWA requires that tribal courts exercising jurisdiction over non-Indian 
defendants grant such defendants all of the due process protections that the 
defendant would receive in state or federal court,
47
 including the 
requirement that the tribe draw jurors from a “fair cross section of the 
community” that does not systematically exclude any group, “including 
non-Indians.”48  Therefore, in order for tribal courts to exercise jurisdiction 
over non-Indian defendants, VAWA essentially requires that the tribal 
courts function as would state or federal courts. 
II. The Supreme Court’s Rhetoric on Tribal Court Fairness 
The Supreme Court’s historical rhetoric on the fairness of tribal court 
practices demonstrates the Court’s strong concerns about the fairness of 
tribal court jurisdiction over non-Indian defendants. This part explores the 
                                                                                                                 
Survivors of Domestic Violence and Assault in Support of Respondents at 2-3, Dollar 
General Corp. v. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, 136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016) (No. 13-1496), 
2015 WL 6467637 (“The extraordinary magnitude of violence and sexual assault perpetrated 
against Native women and children today constitutes one of the greatest threats to the 
integrity and continued existence of Tribal Governments. Native women are more likely to 
be battered, raped, or sexually assaulted than any other population in the United States. 
Likewise, Native children suffer rates of trauma 2.5 times higher than the national 
average.”). In addition, Sen. Al Franken (D-Min.) and Sen. Jon Testor (D.-Mont.) recently 
introduced a bill to further extend tribal court jurisdictional over non-Indians who commit 
violence against children in Indian country. Tribal Youth and Community Protection Act of 
2016, S. 2785, 114th Cong. (2d Sess. 2016).  
 46. The tribes currently exercising VAWA 2013 jurisdiction are: Assiniboine and Sioux 
Tribes of the Fort Peck Indian Reservation; Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian 
Reservation; Eastern Band of Cherokee; Little Traverse Bay Bands of Odawa Indians; 
Pascua Yaqui Tribe; Seminole Nation of Oklahoma; Sisseton Wahpeton Oyate of the Lake 
Traverse Reservation; and Tulalip Tribes. Tribal Implementation of VAWA Pilot Project, 
NAT’L CONG. OF AM. INDIANS, http://www.ncai.org/tribal-vawa/pilot-project-itwg/pilot-
project (last visited Feb. 14, 2017). 
 47. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, sec. 904, § 204(d)(4), 127 
Stat. at 122. VAWA is carefully crafted to withstand constitutional due process challenges 
non-Indian defendants may bring. Although no such challenges have yet been raised, 
scholars agree that the statute should withstand due process challenges. See, e.g., Shefali 
Singh, Closing the Gap of Justice: Providing Protection for Native American Women 
Through the Special Domestic Violence Criminal Jurisdiction Provision of VAWA, 28 
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 197, 220-27 (2014); Castillo, supra note 17, at 332. 
 48. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, sec. 904, § 204(d)(3), 127 
Stat. at 122. This requirement derives from the constitutional standard for jury fairness as 
articulated in Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979). 
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Court’s treatment of tribal courts, focusing in particular on the Court’s 
rhetoric on the fairness of tribal court jury trials. The cases presented below 
comprise a bulk of federal Indian law and therefore demonstrate the extent 
to which such cases may turn on the due process and general fairness 
concerns as raised by the Chief Justice in argument for Dollar General. 
Understanding these cases, and the Court’s concerns about tribal court 
trials, may inform the scrutiny to which tribal courts exercising jurisdiction 
over non-Indians are subjected.  
The Supreme Court first articulated its mistrust of tribal court systems in 
the 1883 case Ex parte Crow Dog, where the Court determined that it was 
not fair to try Indians in federal court because of the inequality between 
tribal and federal courts.
49
 Crow Dog, a member of the Brule Sioux, killed 
his tribe’s chief, Spotted Tail.50 As punishment for the murder, the tribe 
required Crow Dog to provide goods and payment to Spotted Tail’s family 
for the remainder of Crow Dog’s life.51 Unhappy with this perceived lack of 
justice, the local federal court prosecuted Crow Dog for the murder.
52
 Crow 
Dog was found guilty and the court imposed what it considered a more 
appropriate form of justice: the death penalty.
53
 
The Supreme Court reversed on appeal, holding that the federal court did 
not have jurisdiction over crimes committed between two Indians on Indian 
land.
54
 The Court further explained that, by attempting to exert jurisdiction 
over Indians in federal court, the United States was seeking to try Indians 
“not by their peers, nor by the customs of their people, nor the law of their 
land, but by superiors of a different race, according to the law of a social 
state of which they have an imperfect conception.”55 Such reasoning 
expresses the Court’s view of how different from, and unequal to, tribal 
courts are to state and federal courts. This decision set the groundwork for 
                                                                                                                 
 49. Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 571 (1883). The language in Crow Dog is so 
offensive to Indians that the Court in subsequent references has shortened its citations, 
leaving out the most racist terminology. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 
191, 210-11 (1978). 
 50. Id. at 557. 
 51. Anthony G. Gulig & Sidney L. Harring, “An Indian Cannot Get A Morsel of 
Pork. . . .” A Retrospective on Crow Dog, Lone Wolf, Blackbird, Tribal Sovereignty, Indian 
Land, and Writing Indian Legal History, 38 TULSA L. REV. 87, 89 (2002). 
 52. Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 557. 
 53. Gulig & Harring, supra note 51, at 89. 
 54. See Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 572.  
 55. Id. at 571 (emphasis added).  
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an argument that racial difference between Indians and non-Indians impacts 
the ability for the one to be tried fairly within the other’s court systems.56  
The Court inverted this rhetoric in Oliphant, a devastating 1978 decision 
that divested tribes of all criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, through an 
explanation of why it is unfair for non-Indians to be tried in tribal court.
57
 
The defendants in Oliphant were two non-Indian residents of the Port 
Madison Reservation charged by the Suquamish tribe of, respectively, 
assaulting a tribal officer and engaging in a high-speed car chase.
58
 The 
Supreme Court agreed to hear their habeas petition and found that the 
Suquamish lacked any jurisdiction to try the non-Indian defendants in tribal 
court.
59
 Prefacing its decision, the Court noted one key difference in the due 
process provisions afforded in tribal court as compared to federal and state 
courts: “Non-Indians, for example, are excluded from Suquamish tribal 
court juries.”60 By including this distinction at the outset of its opinion, the 
Court framed the petition broadly as an issue of fairness for non-Indians in 
tribal courts. Instead of deciding the case narrowly, on the facts for that 
tribe’s jury composition and due process concerns, the Court determined 
that no tribe may ever exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-Indian 
defendants.
61
 
                                                                                                                 
 56. Congress then reinforced the Crow Dog Court’s rhetoric. Despite the Court’s 
deprecation of tribal courts and Indian persons in the Crow Dog decision, the Court did 
actually uphold the tribal court decree. Congress then reacted swiftly to this perceived lack 
of justice by enacting the Major Crimes Act granting federal courts jurisdiction over all as-
defined “major crimes” between Indians on Indian lands. The Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1153 (2012), undermined tribal criminal justice systems by extending for the first time 
federal jurisdiction to crimes committed by Indians against other Indians in Indian country, 
an extension justified by the belief that tribal justice systems were not capable of addressing 
serious crimes. See SIDNEY L. HARRING, CROW DOG’S CASE: AMERICAN INDIAN 
SOVEREIGNTY, TRIBAL LAW, AND UNITED STATES LAW IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 136-39 
(1994), Rolnick, supra note 42, at 354 n.55.  
 57. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).  
 58. Id. at 194.  
 59. Id. at 195. 
 60. Id. The Court further explained in a footnote: 
The Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 provides for “a trial by jury of not less 
than six persons,” 25 U.S.C. § 1302(10), but the tribal court is not explicitly 
prohibited from excluding non-Indians from the jury even where a non-Indian 
is being tried. In 1977, the Suquamish Tribe amended its Law and Order Code 
to provide that only Suquamish tribal members shall serve as jurors in tribal 
court. 
Id. at 212 n.4. 
 61. Id. at 195. 
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The Court later cited this reasoning in Duro v. Reina, a 1990 case that 
further limited tribes’ criminal jurisdiction to solely members of a tribe.62 
The Court again highlighted the tribe’s member-only jury pool as a bar 
against jurisdiction: “[s]ince, as a nonmember, Duro cannot vote in tribal 
elections, hold tribal office, or sit on a tribal jury, his relationship with the 
Tribe is the same as the non-Indian’s in Oliphant.”63 Here the Court 
emphasized a distinction between members and nonmembers of the tribe 
instead of between Indians and non-Indians.
64
 Congress corrected the Duro 
decision by enacting a law reinstating tribal court criminal jurisdiction over 
all Indians.
65
 Yet the logic that tribal courts are insular, unfamiliar, and 
therefore unfair to outsider defendants, remained. 
In Strate v. A-1 Contractors,
66
 a civil case decided in 1997, the Court 
considered whether a tribal court was the appropriate forum for a tort suit 
brought by Indians against non-Indians for damages from a car crash that 
occurred on a state highway within the borders of the Fort Berthold 
reservation.
67
 Near the end of the tribe’s argument, Justice O’Connor asked: 
Well, how about if it goes to trial in the tribal court and the tribe 
chooses to use as the jury all the friends and relatives of the 
victim, and they say, yeah, she’s really been injured, and we’re 
going to give a heck of a verdict here, and they do, and suppose 
other errors that might amount to a due process violation in a 
Federal or State court obtain. There is no way to challenge that 
as a due process violation later in any State or Federal court, I 
assume.
68
 
                                                                                                                 
 62. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 679 (1990).  
 63. Id. at 677. Congress responded to Duro’s further narrowing by providing in statute 
that tribal courts do possess criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians (but maintaining 
the ban against jurisdiction over non-Indians). Act of Oct. 28, 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-137, 
105 Stat. 646. 
 64. The Supreme Court generally uses the member-nonmember distinction in civil cases 
and the Indian-non-Indian distinction in criminal cases. See Allison M. Dussias, 
Geographically-Based and Membership-Based Views of Indian Tribal Sovereignty: The 
Supreme Court's Changing Vision, 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1993). 
 65. Act of Oct. 28, 1991, 105 Stat. 646. 
 66. Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997).  
 67. A-1 Contractors v. Strate, Civ. No. A1-92-24, 1992 WL 696330, at *1 (D.N.D. Sept. 
16, 1992).  
 68. Transcript of Oral Argument at 28, A-1 Contractors v. Strate, 520 U.S. 438 (1997) 
(No. 95-1872). 
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Counsel for the tribe disagreed with the Justice and explained that the 
Indian plaintiffs would have to proceed through state court in order to 
collect any judgment issued in tribal court.
69
 The state court would then 
have full review over the tribal court proceeding and could challenge issues 
such as jury composition.
70
 However, the question of why tribal courts 
would be so prejudiced was not addressed. The Court found that the tribal 
court did not have jurisdiction.
71
 
The Supreme Court has also expressed generalized fears of tribal court 
proceedings outside of jury selection. Justice Souter’s concurrence in 
Nevada v. Hicks exemplified the Court’s reasoning:  
Tribal courts also differ from other American courts (and often 
from one another) in their structure, in the substantive law they 
apply, and in the independence of their judges. Although some 
modern tribal courts “mirror American courts” and “are guided 
by written codes, rules, procedures, and guidelines,” tribal law is 
still frequently unwritten, being based instead “on the values, 
mores, and norms of a tribe and expressed in its customs, 
traditions, and practices,” and is often “handed down orally or by 
example from one generation to another” . . . . The resulting law 
applicable in tribal courts is . . . unusually difficult for an 
outsider to sort out.
72
 
Justice Souter’s opinion represents the Court’s mixture of attempted 
respect for tribal court variance yet simultaneous aversion to the as-
described different, difficult system. In particular, the idea that a non-Indian 
would unknowingly be subjected to unfamiliar law and procedure is a 
theme within the Court’s Indian law jurisprudence.73 
Finally, and most recently prior to Dollar General, the Roberts Court in 
its 2008 Plains Commerce decision expressed concern with a tribal court 
judgment against a non-Indian bank in various claims resulting from the 
bank’s foreclosure action.74 In Plains Commerce, the plaintiffs brought 
several claims against the bank in tribal court, including tort, contract, and 
discrimination actions. The Supreme Court objected to the tribal court’s 
                                                                                                                 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Strate, 520 U.S. at 453. 
 72. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 384-85 (2001) (Souter, J., concurring) (citations 
omitted).  
 73. See, e.g., Fletcher & Jurss, supra note 20, at 594 n.1.  
 74. Fletcher, supra note 38, at 838. 
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issuance of monetary damages and found that such damages rested 
improperly upon the discrimination claim:  
[t]he jury found against the Bank on three of the special 
interrogatories, including number 4, the discrimination claim. 
The Bank, the jurors found, “intentionally discriminate[d] 
against the Plaintiffs Ronnie and Lila Long.” The jury then 
entered an award of $750,000… These facts establish that the 
jury could have based its damages award, in whole or in part, on 
the finding of discrimination.
75
 
The Court did not decide Plains Commerce based on due process concerns 
for the non-Indian defendant. Instead, it held that the tribal court lacked 
civil jurisdiction over the claims because non-Indians held the land in 
question in fee and therefore, although the land was within the tribe’s 
geographic boundaries, it was not tribal land.
76
 Yet the Court’s dicta is 
instructive as to the Court’s general concerns with fairness in tribal court 
proceedings. 
III. The Fair Cross-Section Jury Requirement in Indian Country 
Despite the United States government’s mistrust of tribal court 
proceedings presented in Part II above, tribal courts, and particularly those 
that exercise jurisdiction over non-Indians, generally operate in accordance 
with due process requirements. With regard to jury selection procedures, 
many tribes have included non-Indians in their jury pools long before the 
passage of VAWA.
77
 This part presents the constitutional fair-cross section 
standard, considers several case studies to illuminate how a non-Indian’s 
challenge to a tribal court jury pool would be resolved, and then presents 
how the Pascua Yaqui Tribe of southern Arizona, one of the pilot VAWA 
tribes, has adapted its jury selection procedures to meet VAWA and 
constitutional standards.  
  
                                                                                                                 
 75. Plains Comm. Bank v. Long Fam. Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 325 (2008) 
(internal citations omitted). 
 76. Id. at 320. 
 77. See Kevin K. Washburn, American Indians, Crime, and the Law, 104 MICH. L. REV. 
709, 761 (2006); Castillo, supra note 17, at 328 (“The Navajo Nation not only allows non-
Indians to serve on its juries, it even has a procedure in place to ensure than non- Indians are 
called to serve.”). 
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A. The Fair Cross-Section Requirement 
The Sixth Amendment provides criminal defendants with the right to 
trial “by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall 
have been committed.”78 This right has been interpreted to require that jury 
pools resemble a “fair cross-section” of the community within which the 
court sits and is codified into federal law in the Federal Jury Selection and 
Service Act of 1968 (JSSA).
79
  
Duren v. Missouri presents the governing test to determine whether a 
jury selection pool constitutes a fair cross-section of the community.
80
 The 
three-part test is: 
(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a “distinctive” group 
in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in 
venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable 
in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and 
(3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of 
the group in the jury-selection process.
81
 
In Duren, the Court invalidated a jury selection process that produced a jury 
pool containing 15% women in a county where women made up 54% of the 
general population.
82
 Because the disparity between the jury pool and the 
population of women in the community was so clear, the Duren Court did 
not provide many guidelines beyond the actual test for how subsequent 
plaintiffs might successfully challenge their own jury pool schemes.
83
  
The VAWA jury requirements are modeled after the JSSA and Duren 
requirements. VAWA specifically requires that tribal courts exercising 
jurisdiction over non-Indians provide defendants with juries that satisfy 
Duren: 
 In a criminal proceeding in which a participating tribe 
exercises special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction, the 
participating tribe shall provide to the defendant . . . 
 (3) the right to a trial by an impartial jury that is drawn from 
sources that— 
                                                                                                                 
 78. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.  
 79. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1869 (2012). 
 80. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979). 
 81. Id. at 364. 
 82. Id. at 362-63. 
 83. Cynthia A. Williams, Jury Source Representativeness and the Use of Voter 
Registration Lists, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 590, 598 (1990).  
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 (A) reflect a fair cross section of the community; and 
 (B) do not systematically exclude any distinctive group in 
the community, including non-Indians.
84
  
From the plain language of the VAWA jury requirements, the statute is 
designed to provide non-Indian defendants with tribal court juries that 
represent a fair cross-section of the community. Therefore, a federal court 
evaluating a non-Indian’s challenge to a tribal court jury pool will likely 
apply the Duren standard. 
However, because of how obvious the underrepresentation was in Duren, 
the Court’s reasoning in that case provides particularly little guidance for 
plaintiffs bringing fair cross-section challenges on behalf of distinctive 
groups who comprise a very small portion of the general population.
85
  
The Supreme Court’s most recent fair cross-section case involved one 
such minority group. In Berghuis v. Smith,
86
 Smith, an African-American, 
was convicted in Michigan state court by an all-white jury.
87
 Smith argued 
that African-Americans were underrepresented in his jury selection pool 
because African-Americans comprised only 6% of his county’s jury pool 
despite representing 7.28% of the county’s adult population.88 The Court 
denied the challenge, finding that although the 18% comparative disparity 
between the group’s population and representation in jury pools did 
constitute sufficient underrepresentation, Smith failed to prove that the 
state’s jury selection process systematically excluded African-Americans 
under the third Duren prong.
89
 
In addition, Indians almost invariably constitute a very small group 
within the jury selection community.
90
 These cases demonstrate the 
difficulty in showing underrepresentation. Consequently, Indians who have 
brought fair cross-section challenges when prosecuted in state or federal 
courts have faced similar difficulties in showing systematic exclusion.
91
 In 
some cases, Indians have not been able to show that Indians constitute a 
                                                                                                                 
 84. 25 U.S.C.A. § 1304(d) (West 2014).  
 85. Williams, supra note 83, at 598.  
 86. Berghuis v. Smith, 559 U.S. 314 (2010). 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 331. 
 90. See Washburn, supra note 77, at 729.  
 91. See, e.g., United States v. Bushyhead, 270 F.3d 905 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v. 
Etsitty, 130 F.3d 420 (9th Cir. 1997); United States v. Raszkiewicz, 169 F.3d 459 (7th Cir. 
1999).  
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“distinctive community” under the first Duren prong.92 Other times, the 
challenge has failed because the Indian plaintiff was unable to show that the 
underrepresentation was due to systematic exclusion by the court system in 
question.
93
 Regardless of which prong the Indian plaintiff failed to satisfy, 
the Duren test has not proven to be very useful for Indian plaintiffs 
challenging federal and state court jury pool compositions. 
Similarly, non-Indians will most likely comprise a small portion of a 
tribal community’s population. Therefore, in theory, non-Indians should 
face related issues when attempting to challenge their tribal court jury pools 
as have Indians who challenge federal and state court jury pools.
94
 
But there are several reasons why non-Indians bringing Duren challenges 
may be treated differently than Indians have been. First, ICRA requires that 
tribal courts provide defendants with many, but not all, of the substantive 
protections provided in the Bill of Rights.
95
 Consequently, federal courts 
scrutinize tribal courts’ practices much more so than they do other federal, 
or even state, court practices. 
In addition, not all tribes permit non-Indians to become tribal members.
96
 
Because of this, a non-Indian defendant may have no ability to influence a 
tribe’s laws. Yet under VAWA, the non-Indian defendant would be entitled 
to a jury that does not discriminate against non-Indians.
97
 Therefore, the 
non-Indian would not be able to argue that his or her inability to be a tribal 
member bears any relation to the fairness of his or her jury pool. 
Consequently, this factor should not affect a Duren challenge.  
However, based on past treatment of tribal courts as compared with state 
and federal courts, tribes should expect to be treated differently within a 
Duren analysis as well. In particular, non-Indians would certainly be able to 
show that they represent a “distinctive” group within the community.98 
                                                                                                                 
 92. Raszkiewicz, 169 F.3d at 467. 
 93. Bushyhead, 270 F.3d at 910; Etsitty, 130 F.3d at 425.  
 94. See Castillo, supra note 17, at 332.  
 95. Kevin Washburn, Reconsidering the Commission's Treatment of Tribal Courts, 17 
FED. SENT’G REP. 209, 210 (2005), http://doi.org/10.1525/fsr.2005.17.3.209. See United 
States. v. Bryant, No. 15-420 (U.S. June 13, 2016) (noting that one of the key due process 
rights not provided in tribal court is the right to counsel for indigent defendants on trial for 
misdemeanors).  
 96. See Rolnick, supra note 42, at 425 (demonstrating that each tribe has its own 
membership requirements, some of which still include blood quantum). 
 97. See 25 U.S.C.A. § 1304(d) (West 2014). 
 98. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979). 
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VAWA specifically names non-Indians as persons who cannot be excluded 
from tribal court jury rolls, thus defining them as distinctive.
99
  
Furthermore, a non-Indian who goes to trial in front of a jury of all tribal 
members appears to raise all of the concerns that have troubled Congress 
and the Supreme Court since the beginnings of federal Indian law policy. 
Regardless of whether the jury pool included non-Indians and thus satisfied 
Duren, a reviewing court may likely still find that such a jury did not 
adequately protect the non-Indian defendant’s due process rights.  
So long as tribes are considered to be sovereign governments operating 
with different concepts of law and justice, tribal courts will continue to face 
the scrutiny and mistrust that impedes their ability to regain jurisdiction 
over non-Indians. It is for this reason that tribes wishing to exercise 
jurisdiction over non-Indians likely should expand their own concepts of 
community to better include the non-Indians living and working within the 
tribes’ territorial boundaries, so as to hedge against claims of unfairness.  
As tribal courts begin to exercise VAWA jurisdiction and effectively 
demonstrate that tribal courts are “fair” forums for non-Indians, tribes can 
pave the way for expanded jurisdiction over non-Indians to better facilitate 
justice within Indian country.  
B. The Pascua Yaqui Tribe’s Implementation Process 
Tribes that currently exercise VAWA jurisdiction have made the 
necessary changes to include non-Indians within the community in the 
tribes’ jury selection processes.100 Because of differences between tribal 
                                                                                                                 
 99. 25 U.S.C.A. § 1304(d). 
 100. Fulfilling the requirement that juries expanding tribal criminal jurisdiction under the 
Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013 must represent a “fair cross section 
of the community,” tribal courts have altered their tribal codes to include non-Indians within 
jury pools. See Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, 
sec. 904, § 204(b)(4)(B), 127 Stat. 54, 122 (codified at 25 U.S.C.A. § 1304(b)(1) (West 
2014)); FORT PECK TRIBES COMPREHENSIVE CODE OF JUSTICE tit. 6, ch. 5 § 507(b)(1), (c)-(d) 
(requiring the juror list for special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction include fifty tribal 
members and fifty non-tribal members, randomly summoning twenty-one individuals and 
choosing six); SISSETON-WAHPETON OYATE CODES OF LAW ch. 23, § 23-10-03, -04, -05 
(compiling a potential juror list that includes tribal members, residents within the tribe’s 
jurisdictional boundaries, full time employees of the tribe, and individuals leasing tribal 
lands); PASCUA YAQUI TRIBAL CODE, 3 PYTC 2-1-160 (pulling potential jurors from tribal 
members, individuals living in tribal housing, and anyone working for the tribe); TULALIP 
TRIBAL CODES ch. 2.05, § 110 (creating a potential juror list from tribal members and 
employees of the tribe’s casino and Quil Ceda Village, then referencing census data to 
ensure it reflects a fair cross-section); CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF THE UMATILLA INDIAN 
RESERVATION, CRIMINAL CODE AND PROCEDURES ch. 3, § 3.19 (using county voter 
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court systems, each tribe must figure out its own means of incorporating the 
VAWA jury requirements to its existing system. Some tribes exercising 
VAWA jurisdiction employ different jury selection procedures for VAWA 
and non-VAWA cases, limiting jury service in non-VAWA cases to tribal 
members.
101
 Yet other tribes include non-Indians with ties to the tribal 
community, such as non-Indians who live or work in Indian country, in all 
jury selection pools.
102
 
The Pascua Yaqui Tribe is an example of one tribe that had to change its 
jury selection practices in order to satisfy the VAWA requirements. The 
Yaqui was one of three tribes to first exercise enhanced VAWA 
jurisdiction. Yaqui courts have been working through jury selection issues 
since February 2014.
103
 In addition, the Yaqui have been active in the 
Intertribal Technical-Assistance Working Group on Special Domestic 
Violence Criminal Jurisdiction (ITWG), a group that develops and shares 
                                                                                                                 
registration lists to find and summon potential jurors from any resident of the Umatilla 
Indian Reservation, regardless of tribal membership); Fletcher & Jurss, supra note 20, at 615 
n.117. 
 101. See 6 FORT PECK TRIBES COMPREHENSIVE CODE OF JUSTICE § 507(b)(1) (defining 
eligible juror in VAWA 2013 prosecution as any resident within the boundaries of the Fort 
Peck Reservation age of eighteen or over, regardless of race or tribal citizenship not 
otherwise disqualified under Court standards, and defining eligible juror in non-VAWA 
2013 prosecution as a tribal member who is at least eighteen years old, “is of sound mind an 
discretion, has never been convicted of a felony, is not a member of the Tribal Council, or a 
judge, officer or employee of the court or an employee of the Reservation police or 
Reservation jail, and is not otherwise disqualified according to standards established by the 
Court”); Jordan Gross, Let the Jury Fit the Crime: Increasing Native American Jury Pool 
Representation in Federal Judicial Districts Within Indian Country Criminal Jurisdiction, 
77 MONT. L. REV. 281, 302 (2016).  
 102. See e.g., CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF THE UMATILLA INDIAN RESERVATION CRIM. 
CODE § 3.19(A) (as amended by Resolution No. 14-018, Mar. 24, 2014) ("[A]ny resident 
within the boundaries of the Umatilla Indian Reservation of the age of 18 or over is eligible 
to be a juror regardless of race or tribal citizenship."); LAW AND ORDER CODE OF THE 
TULALIP TRIBE § 1.11.2 (stating that jurors "shall be chosen from the following classes of 
persons: 1) tribal members living on or near the Tulalip Indian Reservation; 2) residents of 
the Tulalip Indian Reservation; and 3) employees of the Tulalip Tribes or any of its 
enterprises, agencies, subdivisions, or instrumentalities who have been employed by the 
Tribes for at least one continuous year prior to being called as a juror"); Gross, supra note 
101, at 302. 
 103. See generally ALFRED URBINA & MELISSA TATUM, CONSIDERATIONS IN 
IMPLEMENTING VAWA’S SPECIAL DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CRIMINAL JURISDICTION AND 
TLOA’S ENHANCED SENTENCING AUTHORITY: A LOOK AT THE EXPERIENCE OF THE PASCUA 
YAQUI TRIBE (Oct. 2014), http://www.ncai.org/tribal-vawa/getting-started/Practical_Guide_ 
to_Implementing_VAWA_TLOA_letter_revision_3.pdf. 
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best practices in how tribes should implement the VAWA requirements.
104
  
In May 2017, the Yaqui obtained the first jury trial conviction of a non-
Indian defendant pursuant to VAWA jurisdiction.
105
 
The Pascua Yaqui reside on land outside of the city of Tucson, in 
southern Arizona. Approximately 500 of the 5000 people living within 
Yaqui jurisdictional boundaries identify as non-Indian.
106
 The primary 
employers on Yaqui land are the tribal government and the two tribal 
government-run casinos: the Casino of the Sun and Casino del Sol.
107
  
Prior to exercising VAWA jurisdiction, Yaqui courts obtained jurors 
from an electronic database containing the names of all persons over the 
age of eighteen enrolled in the tribe.
108
 In order to meet the VAWA jury 
requirements, the Yaqui had to expand this database to contain all persons 
within their “community,” including non-Indians.109 The tribe consequently 
went through the process of determining what constitutes such a 
community, taking stock of the many non-Indians who work and live on 
Yaqui land.  
The tribe contacted the Pascua Yaqui Casino Human Resources office 
and the Yaqui Government Human Resources office to obtain lists of all 
non-Yaqui employees working for the casinos and the Yaqui 
government.
110
 In addition, the Yaqui court system asked the tribal housing 
office for a list of non-Yaqui tribal housing residents and the tribal 
enrollment office for a list of tribal members’ non-Indian spouses.111 The 
Yaqui court system added all of these persons to its jury selection pools.
112
  
Through this process, the Yaqui determined that 610 of the 
approximately 1,600 casino employees were non-Indian, 189 of the almost 
                                                                                                                 
 104. Tribal Implementation of VAWA: Resource Center For Implementing Tribal 
Provisions of the Violence Against Women Act, NAT’L CONGRESS OF AM. INDIANS, http:// 
www.ncai.org/tribal-vawa/pilot-project-itwg/about-itwg (last visited Oct. 18, 2016).  
 105. First Non-Indian Jury Trial Conviction in Indian Country Prosecuted at Tucson, 
Arizona's Pascua Yaqui Tribal Court, CISION PR NEWSWIRE (May 23, 2017), http://www. 
prnewswire.com/news-releases/first-non-indian-jury-trial-conviction-in-indian-country-
prosecuted-at-tucson-arizonas-pascua-yaqui-tribal-court-300462521.html. 
 106. URBINA & TATUM, supra note 103, at 32. 
 107. Fire Department, PASCUA YAQUI TRIBE, http://www.pascuayaqui-nsn.gov/index. 
php/fire-department (last visited July 14, 2017). 
 108. Email from Alfred Urbina, Attorney General, Pascua Yaqui Tribe, to author (Sept. 
29, 2016) (on file with author). 
 109. See URBINA & TATUM, supra note 103, at 7. 
 110. Email from Alfred Urbina, supra note 108. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
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900 tribal government employees were non-Indian, and nine non-Indians 
lived in tribal housing.
113
 In addition, thirty non-Indian spouses were 
registered with the enrollment office.
114
 The Yaqui were therefore able to 
add almost 900 non-Indians to its jury pools—a number that reflects the 
sizable presence of non-Indians employed by the Yaqui government and 
enterprises.  
The Yaqui also considered how and if they could enforce jury service 
summonses on these non-Indians despite generally having no civil 
jurisdiction over nonmembers of the tribe.
115
 Because all of the non-Indians 
added to the Yaqui jury pool have some tie to the tribe, either through 
employment, housing, or marriage, the Yaqui determined that they could 
possibly enforce jury service through contract and civil penalties based on 
the non-Indian’s particular relationship with the tribe.116 Such an 
arrangement would hedge against the potential issue of the tribe not having 
any enforcement mechanisms against non-members because of the limited 
scope of tribal civil jurisdiction over non-tribal members.
117
  
But a tribe’s lack of legal ability to enforce non-Indian jury service 
should not by itself constitute a breach of the Duren standard. So long as a 
tribal court summons a non-Indian and the non-Indian has the ability to 
accept such a summons, the tribal court has fulfilled its duty.
118
 If non-
Indians never appeared for a tribal court’s jury duty, then the court’s 
selection process may be found to be inadequate. Until such a situation 
arises, tribal courts should be protected under Duren so long as they are 
able to serve non-Indians with summonses despite having no civil or 
criminal remedies available in the event that the non-Indian fails to respond. 
In summary, tribal courts exercising jurisdiction under VAWA should, in 
theory, be able to provide non-Indian defendants with constitutionally fair 
jury trials. Congress has imposed the requisite due process protections on 
tribal court proceedings, and tribes are taking care to implement these 
protections.  
                                                                                                                 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. See Fletcher, supra note 9 (“The Court’s working theory, memorialized in the 
Montana test, is that Indian nations do not have jurisdiction over nonmembers, except in two 
circumstances. One is where nonmember activity is potentially “catastrophic” to tribal 
government operations and reservation life. The other is where a nonmember consents, 
usually through a commercial transaction, to tribal jurisdiction.”); Montana v. United States, 
450 U.S. 544, 564-65 (1981). 
 116. Email from Alfred Urbina, supra note 108. 
 117. See Fletcher, supra note 9. 
 118. Castillo, supra note 17, at 332. 
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However, because the jurisdiction granted by VAWA is nevertheless 
insufficient to address current problems with law enforcement in Indian 
country, Congress should consider a further expansion of tribal court 
jurisdiction over non-Indians under a “community recognition standard” as 
articulated in this next part. 
IV. The Fairness of Indian Tribes’ Right to Govern 
In light of tribal courts regaining some, albeit quite limited, jurisdiction 
over non-Indians through VAWA, it is appropriate to once again step back 
and consider the fairness implications of tribal court jurisdiction over non-
Indians more broadly.
119
 A tribal court is one of the few jurisdictions that 
does not possess geographic, or territorial, jurisdiction over every person 
who enters the tribe’s geographic boundaries.120 Therefore, unlike when an 
American commits a crime in Canada and the American is subject to 
Canadian law despite the fact that the American is not a Canadian citizen, 
non-Indians may commit crimes in Indian country and use the defense of 
not being a member of the Indian tribe to bar the tribal court’s 
jurisdiction.
121
 Such an arrangement is arguably unfair on its face to the 
tribal governments attempting to regulate their lands.  
There is a fundamental tension between a tribe’s right to have territorial 
jurisdiction over its lands and the unique relationship between Indian tribal 
governments and the United States. Because tribes will likely never be 
recognized by the United States as separate sovereign nations, there is 
                                                                                                                 
 119. The idea that tribes should retain jurisdiction over tribal lands is not a new one. 
Scholars have called for Congress and/or the Supreme Court to recognize an expansion of 
tribal court jurisdiction for years. See, e.g., Alison Burton, What About the Children? 
Extending Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction to Crimes Against Children, 52 HARVARD CIVIL 
RIGHTS – CIVIL LIBERTIES L. REV. 193 (2017); Amanda M.K. Pacheco, Broken Traditions: 
Overcoming the Jurisdictional Maze to Protect Native American Women from Sexual 
Violence, 11 J. L. & SOC. CHALLENGES 1, 3 (2009); Amy Radon, Tribal Jurisdiction and 
Domestic Violence: The Need for Non-Indian Accountability on the Reservation, 37 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 1275, 1277-78 (2004); Frickey, supra, note 18, at 1. 
 120. See Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909) (“[T]he general 
and almost universal rule is that the character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be 
determined wholly by the law of the country where the act is done.”); David Wolitz, 
Criminal Jurisdiction and the Nation-State: Toward Bounded Pluralism, 91 OREGON L. REV. 
725, 730 (2012) (“The doctrine of territoriality—according to which criminal jurisdiction is 
determined by the territorial location of the crime—seems to answer most questions about 
which criminal justice system has jurisdiction over which crimes.”); see Rolnick, supra note 
42, at 338. 
 121. See Rolnick, supra note 42.  
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perhaps a need for an “intermediate” form of territorial and membership-
based sovereignty. Under such a model, tribal governments could better 
control Indian country without violating the due process rights of non-
Indians and other non-tribal members. 
Critical race theorist and Indian law scholar Addie Rolnick has created 
one such model that she calls a “community recognition standard.”122 Under 
this standard, tribes should have criminal jurisdiction over “anyone who is 
recognized by the tribe as a member of the community.”123 This definition 
allows tribes to maintain whatever requirements they may have for tribal 
membership, some of which include blood quantum, while also assimilating 
non-Indians whom they feel are part of their greater community into tribal 
court proceedings as jury members.
124
 The community recognition standard 
is a hybrid between the geographic and membership-based conceptions of 
jurisdiction that have defined past federal Indian law jurisprudence.
125
 Such 
a hybrid model more accurately reflects the unique status of Indian tribes 
within American law than does either a purely geographic or purely 
membership-based conception of jurisdictional power. 
Rolnick’s model presents a logical outgrowth of VAWA jurisdiction. By 
enacting VAWA, Congress recognized the need for tribal courts to 
adjudicate claims against non-Indians, but only in those specific instances 
where the non-Indian defendant has demonstrated close ties to the tribe or 
to tribal members.
126
 Expanding this logic, there are many more instances 
when tribal courts can—and should—exercise jurisdiction over non-Indians 
who have close ties to the tribe’s community. For example, the Tribal 
Youth and Community Protection Act, a bill presented to Congress in 2016, 
would expand tribal court jurisdiction over non-Indians who commit acts of 
                                                                                                                 
 122. Id. at 345. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 423-24. 
 125. See Dussias, supra note 64. 
 126. 25 U.S.C.A. § 1304(b)(4)(b) (West 2014). 
 A participating tribe may exercise special domestic violence criminal 
jurisdiction over a defendant only if the defendant— 
 (i) resides in the Indian country of the participating tribe; 
 (ii) is employed in the Indian country of the participating tribe; or 
 (iii) is a spouse, intimate partner, or dating partner of— 
 (I) a member of the participating tribe; or 
 (II) an Indian who resides in the Indian country of the participating 
tribe. 
Id.  
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domestic violence against children.
127
 There could foreseeably be many 
more instances where a non-Indian displays sufficient ties to a tribal 
community to be properly held in tribal court despite not having tribal 
membership. 
The community recognition standard allows a tribe, as authorized by a 
required future act of Congress, to determine whether or not to exercise 
jurisdiction over non-Indians. This is a fair distribution of power: Congress 
and the Supreme Court have already set the requirements tribal courts must 
meet in order to exercise jurisdiction.
128
 It should then be the tribes who are 
granted the option of determining whether they can meet those standards, 
just as is the case with the VAWA jurisdiction. 
In addition, the community recognition standard accurately reflects the 
composition of most of Indian country today.
129
 It seems particularly unfair 
that tribal courts are not sufficiently able to adjudicate crimes committed 
within Indian country just because a majority of persons physically residing 
in Indian country do not identify as Indians. Because Congress’ attempt to 
confer criminal jurisdiction to state and federal governments has generally 
shown to be ineffective in combating crime, tribal courts are arguably the 
best-situated forums to adjudicate these claims.
130
  
Therefore, when the Court invariably hears its first fair cross-section 
challenge brought by a non-Indian convicted in tribal court, it should 
conduct a two-part fairness analysis: First, it should ensure that the 
defendant was provided a fair jury under the Duren standard. And second, 
particularly because it is so difficult to prove these fair cross-section claims 
when the population in question represents a small group within the 
jurisdiction, the Court should refrain from applying its historical analysis as 
to tribal court fairness.  
It is clear that the status quo, where tribal courts retain extremely little 
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, has not been effective in combating 
                                                                                                                 
 127. Tribal Youth and Community Protection Act of 2016, S. 2785, 114th Cong. (2d 
Sess. 2016). The VAWA only allows for jurisdiction against non-Indians who commit acts 
of domestic violence against other adults. 
 128. See Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2012); see supra Parts I and II. 
 129. See supra Part I.  
 130. Rolnick, supra note 42, at 349-50 (“Within Indian country, the federal government 
exercises jurisdiction over crimes between Indians and non-Indians and certain enumerated 
major crimes involving only Indians. In some areas, states exercise Indian country criminal 
jurisdiction in place of the federal government pursuant to Public Law 280 or a similar 
law.”) (citing the Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2012); Public Law 280, Act of Aug. 
15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 
U.S.C. and 25 U.S.C.)).  
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crime in Indian country.
131
 One reason for why the status quo is inadequate 
is that criminal law is intended to be local in nature.
132
 Yet, in Indian 
country, the local court is almost always the tribal court and the tribal court 
invariably will not have jurisdiction if the perpetrator of the crime is not 
Indian.  
The current solution is for the federal government, or occasionally for 
state governments, to prosecute those crimes that a tribal government 
cannot.
133
 But even putting aside practical considerations such as the federal 
government’s lack of funding for Indian country prosecutions or lack of 
interest in prosecuting crimes that often take place in rural and remote 
areas, having the federal government handle routine Indian country crimes 
simply does not make sense.
134
 Federal courthouses, prosecutors, and law 
enforcement officers are rarely located near the scene of the crime.
135
 This 
geographic distance makes going to trial burdensome for all parties 
involved and over time can result in a perversion of justice.
136
 
Consequently, most Indian law scholars and policymakers agree that the 
current model is insufficient for addressing crime within Indian country. 
Perhaps the most obvious alternative to the status quo would be for tribes 
to regain full criminal jurisdiction over all persons within a tribe’s 
geographic boundaries. Not only would this solution clarify criminal 
jurisdiction in Indian country, it would also recognize the sovereignty of 
tribal governments. Tribes would then have the same criminal jurisdiction 
over tribal lands as do state governments over state geographic boundaries. 
It is important to note that no Indian law scholars advocate outright for 
such territorial jurisdiction—likely because such an idea is untenable in 
light of current federal Indian law and policy.
137
 Even the small, carefully 
crafted amount of jurisdiction granted to tribes under VAWA has caused 
                                                                                                                 
 131. See STEVEN W. PERRY, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
AMERICAN INDIANS AND CRIME: A BJS STATISTICAL PROFILE, 1992-2002, at 5 (2004), 
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/aic02.pdf; Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. 
No. 111-211, § 202(a)(5), 124 Stat. 2261, 2262. 
 132. Washburn, supra note 77, at 713. 
 133. Id. at 712. On some reservations in so-called Public Law 280 states, state 
governments are tasked with Indian country law enforcement. See generally Carole E. 
Goldberg, Public Law 280: The Limits of State Jurisdiction over Reservation Indians, 22 
UCLA L. REV. 535 (1975); Washburn, supra note 77, at 712 n.13. 
 134. Washburn, supra note 77, at 713. 
 135. Id. at 712. 
 136. Id. at 712-14. 
 137. See supra Part II. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol41/iss2/1
No. 2] FAIRNESS OF TRIBAL COURT JURIES 277 
 
 
some concerns within the legal community.
138
 Instead, persuasive 
scholarship has largely focused on highlighting flaws in the current system 
and offering some potential solution in the abstract.
139
  
Therefore, the community recognition standard is currently the most 
realistic, yet impressively aspirational, standard offered to replace the status 
quo. This standard acknowledges the complicated history between Indian 
tribes and the United States, as well as the delicacy involved in Indian law 
advocacy, and limits tribal criminal jurisdiction to only those non-Indians 
whom the tribe believes have demonstrated adequate ties to the tribe. At the 
same time, the community recognition standard also places some power 
back into the hands of tribal governments by allowing tribes to define their 
communities, and thus the extent of their jurisdiction, within boundaries set 
by Congress and the Supreme Court.  
In addition, this standard builds logically upon VAWA. VAWA created 
the framework for considering ties between a tribe and certain non-Indians 
by granting tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indian perpetrators of 
intimate domestic violence against tribal members. This format can 
certainly be expanded to eventually reach all non-Indians with whom the 
tribe has a relationship.  
The community recognition standard presents tribal policymakers with a 
guideline for how to advocate for continued expansion of tribal criminal 
jurisdiction through successive legislative grants instead of through court-
made law. It is a guideline for where tribal criminal jurisdiction should be 
headed so long as tribes can demonstrate their abilities to provide non-
Indians with fair trials. 
It may be difficult for tribes to show that they can fairly adjudicate 
claims against non-Indians. As seen in Part II, the Supreme Court has long 
articulated concerns about the differences between tribal court practices and 
state and federal court practices. However, the community recognition 
standard acknowledges that some non-Indians have demonstrated sufficient 
ties to the tribal community to effectively be put on notice as to the tribal 
court’s jurisdiction.  
Provided that tribal courts afford all defendants, including non-Indians, 
with fair trials as mandated by the United States Constitution, it is 
                                                                                                                 
 138. See e.g., Thomas F. Gede, Criminal Jurisdiction of Indian Tribes: Should Non-
Indians Be Subject to Tribal Criminal Authority Under VAWA?, ENGAGE, July 2012, at 40, 
http://www.fed-soc.org/library/doclib/20120806_GedeEngage13.2.pdf. 
 139. See e.g., Katharine C. Oakley, Defining Indian Status for the Purpose of Federal 
Criminal Jurisdiction, 35 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 177 (2010-2011); Washburn, supra note 77; 
Dussias, supra note 64.  
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additionally fair to restore a tribal court’s criminal jurisdiction over all 
persons within that tribe’s community: Indians and non-Indians alike. With 
time, perhaps this model will come to describe the state of criminal 
jurisdiction in Indian country. 
V. Conclusion 
As demonstrated in Part II above, the Supreme Court has long discussed 
the fairness concern of subjecting non-Indians to the sometimes-unfamiliar 
practices and procedures of tribal court systems. The Court has 
subsequently chosen to privilege non-Indian defendants’ rights, often at the 
expense of the tribal government’s ability to regulate its land and its people.  
Although Indian tribes face considerable obstacles before they can 
convince Congress and the Supreme Court of their fitness to adjudicate 
claims against non-Indians in tribal court, the changing composition of 
Indian country may help alter the course of tribal court jurisdiction in the 
public mind. So far, Supreme Court rhetoric has reflected American 
society’s wariness of tribal justice systems. But as more non-Indians live 
and work within Indian country, and as tribes gain recognition in modern 
society, fears of tribal court unfairness may begin to lessen. Such societal 
change may influence federal court review of tribal court practices.
140
  
Therefore, in light of the competing fairness concern for tribes to be able 
to adequately police their land, Congress should recognize tribal courts’ 
jurisdiction over all non-Indians within a tribe’s community, however the  
particular tribe chooses to define this term, so as to better reflect the 
changing populations in Indian country. Such a jurisdictional grant should 
likely survive judicial review, despite current precedent.  
                                                                                                                 
 140. See e.g., Brian Leiter, Legal Realism and Legal Doctrine, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1975, 
1979 (2015) (“‘Judges are human,’ wrote [Felix] Cohen, ‘but they are a peculiar breed of 
humans, selected to a type and held to service under a potent system of government 
controls. . . . A truly realistic theory of judicial decisions must conceive every decision as 
something more than an expression of individual personality, as . . . a product of social 
determinants.’”) (quoting Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional 
Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 843 (1935)).  
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